Philosophy of Action (FIL2207)
Pensum ¨C Fall 2014
Introductory text book:
Stout, Rowland (2005), Action, Chesham: Acumen. (158 s.) (Book recommended bought, Akademika)
Monograph:
Anscombe, Elizabeth (1957), Intention, Oxford: Blackwell. (94 s). (Book recommended bought, Akademika)
Papers and book chapters:
Bratman, Michael (1993), ¡°Shared Intention¡±, Ethics, Vol. 104, pp. 97¨C113. (16 s.)
Bratman, Michael (2000), ¡°Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency¡±, Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, pp. 35-61. (34 s.) [Also in M. Bratman, Structures of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007).]
Davidson, Donald (1980), ¡°Action, Reasons and Causes¡±, ¡°Agency¡±, ¡°Intending¡±, ¡°How is Weakness of the Will Possible?¡±, In D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press. (75 s.) (Book recommended bought, Akademika)
Fitzpatrick, William (2004), ¡°Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents¡±, Mind, Vol. 113, pp. 285¨C318. (33 s.)
Foot, Philippa (1972), ¡°Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives¡±, Philosophical Review, Vol. 81, pp. 305¨C316. (11 s.) [Also in P. Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell (1978).]
Gilbert, Margaret (2009), ¡°Shared Intention and Personal Intentions¡±, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 144, pp. 167¨C187. (20 s.)
Frankfurt, Harry (1988). ¡°The Problem of Action¡±, ¡°Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person¡±, ¡°Identification and Externality¡±, ¡°Identification and Wholeheartedness¡±, In H. Frankfurt The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (55 s.)(Book recommended bought, Akademika)
Korsgaard, Christine (1986), ¡°Skepticism about Practical Reason¡±, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXXIII, pp. 5¨C 25. (20 s.)
Markovits, Julia (2011), ¡°Why be an Internalist about Reasons?¡±, In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 255¨C279. (26 s.)
Smith, Michael (1997), ¡°Internal Reasons¡±, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LV, pp. 109¨C 131. (22 s.)
Velleman, David (1992), ¡°What Happens When Someone Acts?¡±, Mind, Vol. 101, pp. 461¨C481. (20 s.) [Also in D. Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon (2000).]
Velleman, David (1996), ¡°The Possibility of Practical Reason¡±, Ethics, Vol. 106, pp. 694¨C726. (32 s.) [Also in D. Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon (2000).]
Watson, Gary (1975), ¡°Free Agency¡±, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, pp. 205¨C220 (15 s.)
[Also in G. Watson (ed.) Fee Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1982 and later).]
Compendium:
Gert, Joshua (2000), ¡°Practical Rationality, Morality, and Purely Justificatory Reasons¡±, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, pp. 227¨C243. (16 s.)
Hornsby, Jennifer (1980), Ch. 1. "Actions and Bodily Movements", Ch. 2. "Bodily Movements and Muscle Contractions", Ch. 3 ¡°Acting and Trying to Act¡±, in J. Hornsby Action, London: Kegan Paul, (appendixes to Ch. 1 and Ch. 2 are excluded). (38 s.)
McDowell, John (1995), ¡°Might there be External Reasons?¡±, In J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.) World, Mind, and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 68¨C85. (17 s.)
Williams, Bernard (1981), ¡°Internal and External Reasons¡±, In B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101¨C113. (12 s.)
(Number of pages: 714.)