WEBVTT Kind: captions; language: en-us NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 86% (H?Y) 00:00:01.500 --> 00:00:09.100 Welcome to this second week of the anthropology and environmental course, it was good to see you all 00:00:09.100 --> 00:00:17.900 last Thursday and I am also really impressed with how prepared you were. Keep up the good work. Today 00:00:17.900 --> 00:00:24.600 we're going to look at two classical themes in environmental anthropology. Commons and the 00:00:24.600 --> 00:00:31.200 politics of knowledge so starting out with a debate about commons NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 76% (H?Y) 00:00:32.200 --> 00:00:35.400 Going to get my slides going NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:00:37.200 --> 00:00:40.000 There we are NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 77% (H?Y) 00:00:40.000 --> 00:00:51.600 What started that debate was an extremely influential article by Hardin written in 00:00:51.600 --> 00:01:01.300 1968 it was actually not about commons as such but about population growth, but what he's remembered 00:01:01.300 --> 00:01:08.300 from that article and what is used still today you hear about the tragedy of the commons so what is 00:01:08.300 --> 00:01:10.650 used from that article NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 83% (H?Y) 00:01:10.650 --> 00:01:20.400 is what he said about the impossibility of having commons that are not regulated. He starts out bad 00:01:20.400 --> 00:01:31.000 saying that there are a set of problems that can't be fixed technically you need some kind of 00:01:31.000 --> 00:01:39.100 political enforcement of solutions to solve these kind of problems, and he mentions a few but argues 00:01:39.100 --> 00:01:40.550 then that population is NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 79% (H?Y) 00:01:40.550 --> 00:01:50.400 is one of them. He draws on Thomas Malthus' argument to make that claim this is in itself 00:01:50.400 --> 00:01:58.800 quite a problematic argument that Malthus is making, we won't talk about that now but basically what 00:01:58.800 --> 00:02:07.400 Malthus is saying is that population will always grow exponentially and in a finite world where 00:02:07.400 --> 00:02:10.600 you do not have enough resources to sustain NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 88% (H?Y) 00:02:10.600 --> 00:02:17.700 a population this will eventually lead to overpopulation and then Malthus believed mass 00:02:17.700 --> 00:02:22.800 starvation's which were necessary for populations to regulate themselves. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 75% (MEDIUM) 00:02:27.400 --> 00:02:35.500 Hardin argues then in the article that we will need some kind of situation where population growth will need to 00:02:35.500 --> 00:02:44.200 stabilise and be zero, the question if is this will happen by itself, it will not because we cannot 00:02:44.200 --> 00:02:52.200 really maximise for population and well-being at the same time. Either you everyone will have to live 00:02:52.200 --> 00:02:55.649 at a bare minimum and not NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 80% (H?Y) 00:02:55.649 --> 00:03:05.000 spend energy on vacation, leisure, intellectual work or similar things if you want to have an as 00:03:05.000 --> 00:03:15.100 large population as possible, Hardin argues that we need to stabilise the 00:03:15.100 --> 00:03:23.900 population some way and that this will not happen by itself. He believes that Adam Smith was wrong in assuming 00:03:23.900 --> 00:03:25.550 that an invisible hand NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 79% (H?Y) 00:03:25.550 --> 00:03:32.400 Would mean that enlightened self-interest will lead to what is best for everyone this will not 00:03:32.400 --> 00:03:39.000 happen and this is because of what he calls and that is his famous phrase the tragedy of the 00:03:39.000 --> 00:03:50.649 commons, and here is an important metaphor from his article imagine a 00:03:50.649 --> 00:03:55.800 situation he says where pasture where you grace your cows NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 90% (H?Y) 00:03:55.800 --> 00:04:04.200 it's open to everyone, now all individual herdsmen will want as many cattle as possible for 00:04:04.200 --> 00:04:12.050 themselves to gain their own profit, and this is fine this works well as long as an external force 00:04:12.050 --> 00:04:20.000 regulate how many cattle can be on that pasture, if you have war if you have other kind of 00:04:20.000 --> 00:04:25.850 limitations to how many cows or cattle each person can have this works fine. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 90% (H?Y) 00:04:25.850 --> 00:04:33.100 but in a situation of peace he says then inherent logic of the commons leads to the tragedy of the 00:04:33.100 --> 00:04:42.150 commons and this is because of a really simple mathematical addition he says. If you as an individual 00:04:42.150 --> 00:04:49.700 add one more cow to the field it leads to a gain of one, you have one more cow and you should 00:04:49.700 --> 00:04:51.299 definitely do that. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:04:51.299 --> 00:04:59.000 if everybody keeps on doing that there will eventually be too many cows right, not enough grass for 00:04:59.000 --> 00:05:00.300 everyone. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 80% (H?Y) 00:05:00.300 --> 00:05:09.200 but he argues the problem with this is that nobody will stop adding cows, because the disadvantage 00:05:09.200 --> 00:05:23.600 of adding one more cow is the lack of one additional gracing cow divided by all the different people 00:05:23.600 --> 00:05:30.400 who put cows on them so i.e. while adding one makes you gain one the negative effect of NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 88% (H?Y) 00:05:30.400 --> 00:05:37.800 doing so is shared by everyone, and so people rational self maximizing individual will keep on adding 00:05:37.800 --> 00:05:43.900 cows until all the cows die and that is the tragedy of the commons. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 73% (MEDIUM) 00:05:44.000 --> 00:05:53.350 Freedom in a common he says brings ruin to all and he has a number of examples of that. One 00:05:53.350 --> 00:06:00.500 is pastures that we just went through but also wilderness in national parks, everybody goes in to 00:06:00.500 --> 00:06:07.700 experience wilderness and to be alone in nature but as more and more people do so you have less 00:06:07.700 --> 00:06:14.250 disturbed nature to experience but again nobody would sort of not go NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 73% (MEDIUM) 00:06:14.250 --> 00:06:20.350 Because just adding yourself to it is not going to solve the situation. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 86% (H?Y) 00:06:20.350 --> 00:06:28.900 fishing in the sea with no regulation same thing, the fish stock will deplete and diminish but you 00:06:28.900 --> 00:06:35.300 will still take out as much as you can you will not yourself try to be sustainable because nobody 00:06:35.300 --> 00:06:37.650 else does and it doesn't pay for yourself NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 85% (H?Y) 00:06:37.650 --> 00:06:46.500 it also holds for the reverse situation he says with pollution for instance, so again if 00:06:46.500 --> 00:06:55.000 everybody say farmers around a river put pollution or dump waste into it it doesn't really matter as 00:06:55.000 --> 00:07:01.800 long as they are not many, if they continue to do so as a population grows you will have a negative 00:07:01.800 --> 00:07:07.800 effect there will be less and less pure water but again it doesn't really help if you stop NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 79% (H?Y) 00:07:07.800 --> 00:07:15.900 all right so everybody will keep polluting until the water is completely useless so this is his 00:07:15.900 --> 00:07:25.600 argument about the commons, they only work with a low density of people but now we 00:07:25.600 --> 00:07:31.800 need some kind of enclosure and creation to make them work and this has been done in the past and 00:07:31.800 --> 00:07:37.900 he's talking of course about the enclosures of the common in medieval England and similar situations NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 88% (H?Y) 00:07:37.900 --> 00:07:43.900 but we know how to do so he says for population control. We can't let people decide for themselves 00:07:43.900 --> 00:07:50.600 how many children they will have and in this article he only mentions what seems like 00:07:50.600 --> 00:07:57.700 one solution to this and that is private property. In later article also says that state 00:07:57.700 --> 00:08:05.800 socialism i.e. a strong state control of the commons or enclose the commons will probably also work NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 80% (H?Y) 00:08:08.500 --> 00:08:18.900 now that article has been sort of standing as an almost scientific law as Feeny et. al argues 00:08:18.900 --> 00:08:28.000 They summarise the debate after 22 years and see whether this still 00:08:28.000 --> 00:08:34.850 holds water as a sign as an universal law and even if they are NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 78% (H?Y) 00:08:34.850 --> 00:08:42.400 not anthropologist themselves, the argument they make is very anthropological in that it brings 00:08:42.400 --> 00:08:49.900 empirical nuance to a more universal explanation of the kind that Hardin is making. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 87% (H?Y) 00:08:50.300 --> 00:08:57.900 so they begin by summing up the argument saying that it has reached a status as an universal almost 00:08:57.900 --> 00:09:02.900 and it's used as an argument even more importantly it's still being used as an argument for a 00:09:02.900 --> 00:09:09.200 abandoning commons and to impose some kind of private or state control over resources NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 87% (H?Y) 00:09:09.400 --> 00:09:18.000 there's a number of problems with their argument, first and most importantly he confuses 00:09:18.000 --> 00:09:25.950 what they call characteristics of a resource and the property regimes apply to them. I.e. when you 00:09:25.950 --> 00:09:32.400 talk about private property and the state you need to distinguish those kind of regimes of 00:09:32.400 --> 00:09:39.700 controlling resources from the resources themselves, so they coin a new word a new phrase NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 84% (H?Y) 00:09:39.700 --> 00:09:46.800 which is called common property resources, not just common property right and a common property 00:09:46.800 --> 00:09:56.800 resource is defined by two characteristics 1) it has a problem with excludability i.e. it's difficult to 00:09:56.800 --> 00:10:02.900 exclude potential users like the pasture that Hardin mentioned for instance, it's not self-evident 00:10:02.900 --> 00:10:09.550 that it's an easy fix to exclude other people from exploiting the resource. 2) just as important NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 79% (H?Y) 00:10:09.550 --> 00:10:18.099 it has a problem with subtractability, which means that it matters for the people who use the resource, 00:10:18.099 --> 00:10:25.400 each user abstracts from the welfare of the other users and if you think about that that applies to 00:10:25.400 --> 00:10:33.800 all the cases but that Hardin mention, so they defined a common property resource as a class of 00:10:33.800 --> 00:10:39.550 resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves subtractability NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 71% (MEDIUM) 00:10:39.550 --> 00:10:41.400 NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:10:41.800 --> 00:10:50.200 This then needs to be distinguished from property right regimes and these they point out are 00:10:50.200 --> 00:10:56.400 ideal types for those of you who have read social science you know what an ideal type is it's a 00:10:56.400 --> 00:11:05.900 phrase taken from Max Weber where he says that in order to think and analyse a situation we could 00:11:05.900 --> 00:11:11.900 start with pure forms that we don't necessarily find in the world but they are helpful to think 00:11:11.900 --> 00:11:12.599 with NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:11:12.599 --> 00:11:18.600 which basically means that you won't have pure open Access situation or pure private property 00:11:18.600 --> 00:11:25.800 situations or pure communal property situations but if you look at an empirical case you'll find a 00:11:25.800 --> 00:11:35.300 mix, in terms of logic and and analysis it's helpful to think of them as ideal types right. 00:11:35.300 --> 00:11:42.600 The first ideal type is open access, free and open to all for example oceans before the 20th century NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 89% (H?Y) 00:11:42.600 --> 00:11:50.050 When there was no regulation about who extracted anything, the second idea of type of property regimes 00:11:50.050 --> 00:11:59.500 is private property which is defined by a right to exclude people vested in individual and or a 00:11:59.500 --> 00:12:05.550 group but also backed by state and that's an important point when it comes to private property when 00:12:05.550 --> 00:12:11.500 the kind of private property we have in Norway for instance is backed by the state if somebody 00:12:11.500 --> 00:12:12.550 tries to steal NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 84% (H?Y) 00:12:12.550 --> 00:12:18.600 what you think is your private property you go to the police i.e. use the state to back your private 00:12:18.600 --> 00:12:26.800 property, and this property is exclusive and is possible to transfer it to a another person, so a 00:12:26.800 --> 00:12:36.500 private forest or a range land like that is a privately owned pasture would be examples of that. 00:12:36.500 --> 00:12:42.250 communal property then are owned by a community of users NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:12:42.250 --> 00:12:51.100 that is an extremely common form in other parts of the world it tends to exclude people who are not 00:12:51.100 --> 00:12:59.900 part of that community from use and distribute right to use the resource equally within the 00:12:59.900 --> 00:13:01.400 community. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:13:01.400 --> 00:13:09.800 Last ideal type is state property where power is vested in government and enforcement is also done 00:13:09.800 --> 00:13:19.900 by government so state forests for instance would be an example of that so we now have these four 00:13:19.900 --> 00:13:28.800 different kind of property regimes and the two definitions of what a common property resource is. 00:13:29.000 --> 00:13:31.400 A misunderstanding that NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 88% (H?Y) 00:13:31.400 --> 00:13:40.200 Hardin makes they argue is that they see communal property as the same as open access i.e. the example 00:13:40.200 --> 00:13:48.500 we used when we started out with a pasture open to all, that's the first sentence in Hardins 00:13:48.500 --> 00:13:56.000 example so we need to look at what the empirical evidence actually says about exclusion and about 00:13:56.000 --> 00:14:01.349 regulation for the different types rather than assume that communal property means open access NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 77% (H?Y) 00:14:01.349 --> 00:14:09.650 and by what kind of criteria then you would judge success or otherwise in when we examine 00:14:09.650 --> 00:14:17.200 exclusion and regulation for the different types well they say let's use ecologically sustainability, is 00:14:17.200 --> 00:14:23.200 this a way of looking after the resource that does not deplete it and destroy it in the way that 00:14:23.200 --> 00:14:28.700 Hardin argued would happen automatically with communal property. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 88% (H?Y) 00:14:28.900 --> 00:14:32.700 So let's look at the first one then: open access NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 90% (H?Y) 00:14:32.700 --> 00:14:42.900 in terms of exclusion this supports Hardins argument but they the 00:14:42.900 --> 00:14:50.300 situation is often created by for instance a colonial power and this happened for instance in where 00:14:50.300 --> 00:14:58.950 I worked in South Africa where communal property regimes were deregulated because 00:14:58.950 --> 00:15:02.950 community authority were destroyed. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 70% (MEDIUM) 00:15:02.950 --> 00:15:14.900 The regulation likewise is supported by Hardin when supply exceeds the amount so it's 00:15:14.900 --> 00:15:22.450 hard to have some kind of regulation for instance when you can't really control the resource 00:15:22.450 --> 00:15:33.400 and again they use examples from North America. So for open access situations NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 78% (H?Y) 00:15:33.400 --> 00:15:41.400 Hardin's argument tend to be supported but it's partly more complicated by that because these kind of 00:15:41.400 --> 00:15:48.200 situations are often created rather than just given, private property which is Hardin's success 00:15:48.200 --> 00:15:54.400 case also tend to be successful but again they say if you look at the empirical evidence not 00:15:54.400 --> 00:16:01.700 necessarily and not always so when you look at exclusion you have for example a 00:16:01.700 --> 00:16:03.750 classical case like oil in NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:16:03.750 --> 00:16:12.700 Pennsylvania which regulated the oil as private property on the surface of individual farms but the 00:16:12.700 --> 00:16:20.700 resource of course was under the ground and covered several private properties which meant that you 00:16:20.700 --> 00:16:29.100 Did not have a sustainable and helpful way of extracting the oil because rather than 00:16:29.100 --> 00:16:33.650 cooperating in getting access to the oil everybody competed NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 82% (H?Y) 00:16:33.650 --> 00:16:40.900 on the same resource. Enforcement should be easy in a private property situation but is not 00:16:40.900 --> 00:16:49.800 always and the whole phenomena of poaching of illegally taking a resource that is enclosed is 00:16:49.800 --> 00:16:51.850 of course a problem. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 80% (H?Y) 00:16:51.850 --> 00:17:01.500 regulation is also again following Hardin seems to work relatively well because it is the same 00:17:01.500 --> 00:17:08.099 person who would take the cost and the benefit so you wouldn't normally deplete a resource because it 00:17:08.099 --> 00:17:18.900 only hurts yourself but that is not always the case if you have a resource that is so slow in 00:17:18.900 --> 00:17:21.250 reproducing that NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 86% (H?Y) 00:17:21.250 --> 00:17:29.600 you can't really maximise it at all and that would take 2,000 years to grow back or whales 00:17:29.600 --> 00:17:37.000 that would take centuries to rebuild their stock it would actually make sense from a private 00:17:37.000 --> 00:17:43.600 property resource management perspective to rather let them die and take out the resource, the profit 00:17:43.600 --> 00:17:50.500 that you could from them now rather than just wait for that. So again supports Hardin but not 00:17:50.500 --> 00:17:51.550 always. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 78% (H?Y) 00:17:51.550 --> 00:18:01.500 Where they really disagree about Hardin's analysis is for the communal property regime. Hardin thought 00:18:01.500 --> 00:18:09.600 that exclusion in communal property i.e. imagine a farm open to all would be impossible, but it is 00:18:09.600 --> 00:18:16.400 actually the norm, in almost all cases you look at of communal property there is 00:18:16.400 --> 00:18:21.150 regulation, some set of community some set of NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 83% (H?Y) 00:18:21.150 --> 00:18:28.500 people defined as a community control their resource and would not let anybody else that is not part of 00:18:28.500 --> 00:18:38.100 that community on to that resource, a pasture for instance. If a community in 00:18:38.100 --> 00:18:43.900 rural South Africa for instance control a pasture they would not let people outside of the community 00:18:43.900 --> 00:18:51.400 use that pasture and they will also regulate how many cows people could put onto the common resource, so NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 82% (H?Y) 00:18:51.400 --> 00:18:57.350 There is a lot of evidence that actually shows that exclusion happens as the norm in communal property 00:18:57.350 --> 00:19:05.800 and it's not impossible, they also argue that this is not just old ancient regimes or in rural 00:19:05.800 --> 00:19:13.600 situations in Africa it's also happened in newer instances, for instance fisheries in Japan deviced 00:19:13.600 --> 00:19:20.600 A common because they saw that they had a problem with overfishing so they created a membership of 00:19:20.600 --> 00:19:21.350 who could fish NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 88% (H?Y) 00:19:21.350 --> 00:19:25.700 certain areas and decided on how much people can fish NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 87% (H?Y) 00:19:26.700 --> 00:19:36.100 and as they began by saying as well the reason why communal property often fail is 00:19:36.100 --> 00:19:41.800 because of outside pressure, a situation like the one I just described is replaced by a powerful 00:19:41.800 --> 00:19:48.400 group replacing the community and say this is our resource now and then people stopped 00:19:48.400 --> 00:19:54.950 looking after it the people who for instance used it for pasture before would NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 71% (MEDIUM) 00:19:54.950 --> 00:19:59.300 try to poach and take out as much as they can from that resource. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:19:59.300 --> 00:20:07.650 likewise regulation as I've said, tends to work Contra Hardin. 00:20:07.650 --> 00:20:13.600 immediately after he published this article people started pointing out that 00:20:13.600 --> 00:20:20.100 his main case the commons of medieval England actually functioned for several 00:20:20.100 --> 00:20:28.000 centuries and they were regulated, and again for regulation there's also new instances again an 00:20:28.000 --> 00:20:29.050 example from NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 88% (H?Y) 00:20:29.050 --> 00:20:35.600 from fisheries where people decide on we need some kind of regulation here and that 00:20:35.600 --> 00:20:44.050 happens it's also happens in again from my part of the world South Africa where 00:20:44.050 --> 00:20:50.500 Rivers for instance used for farming you would have the problem of people high up in the stream 00:20:50.500 --> 00:20:57.800 extracting too much water leaving nothing for the farmers downstream that is often sold by 00:20:57.800 --> 00:20:58.950 regulation NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 76% (H?Y) 00:20:58.950 --> 00:21:05.000 you create a water committee a water board who decides on who gets to take out how much water, so 00:21:05.000 --> 00:21:13.300 there is enough for everyone. Where Hardin is basically seriously wrong is in thinking that 00:21:13.300 --> 00:21:20.100 exclusion and regulation is not possible for communal property, all empirical evidence show that it 00:21:20.100 --> 00:21:29.050 is possible and it's often in position of outside forces that destroy these kind of regimes. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 89% (H?Y) 00:21:29.050 --> 00:21:34.900 State Property the other thing that he thought would function quite unproblematically also tends to 00:21:34.900 --> 00:21:41.600 but again for exclusion you could have a problem with legitimacy, if people don't really 00:21:41.600 --> 00:21:47.700 believe that the state should make this decision you will end up with situations where they try to 00:21:47.700 --> 00:21:54.850 avoid it and take out control and take out resources, this happens with poaching in 00:21:54.850 --> 00:21:57.000 state-controlled NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 85% (H?Y) 00:21:58.200 --> 00:22:07.700 parks for instance national parks in South Africa and likewise with regulation again it tends 00:22:07.700 --> 00:22:14.699 to be quite easy because it's one act of the state that imposes a set of regulations on the resource 00:22:14.699 --> 00:22:23.000 but as we know can happen when a state or different interest within a state try to impose control 00:22:23.000 --> 00:22:29.100 you might have a proliferation of laws because so many different interests so many different state NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 86% (H?Y) 00:22:29.100 --> 00:22:35.500 Bodies try to have their interest expressed in the regulation so it's not completely 00:22:35.500 --> 00:22:38.050 straightforward there as well. NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 77% (H?Y) 00:22:38.050 --> 00:22:44.700 so to sum up the argument Hardin assumed when he talks about the impossibility of common that 00:22:44.700 --> 00:22:51.700 Commons always had open access that there were no way of constraining or regulating the resource 00:22:51.700 --> 00:23:00.700 that demand exceeds supply that uses could not change the rules like we saw happened with the 00:23:00.700 --> 00:23:07.200 modern coastal fisheries in Japan and Turkey and most importantly he did not distinguish between 00:23:07.200 --> 00:23:08.949 communal property resources NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 81% (H?Y) 00:23:08.949 --> 00:23:12.250 And communal property regimes NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 90% (H?Y) 00:23:12.250 --> 00:23:20.200 which led him to argue that there is no sustainable management and exclusion except for private 00:23:20.200 --> 00:23:29.100 and state property and that they are good enough correct there are a lot of 00:23:29.100 --> 00:23:38.500 examples of regulation and exclusion for especially communal property and it's not the case either 00:23:38.500 --> 00:23:42.500 that private or state property always is sufficient to manage our resource NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 73% (MEDIUM) 00:23:42.500 --> 00:23:51.650 so what we need to look at instead when we talk about commons or contrast commons with 00:23:51.650 --> 00:23:59.750 private and state property is to look at the complex interaction between the resource themselves 00:23:59.750 --> 00:24:09.900 and the kind of characteristics they have in this case but it's possible to that it's difficult to 00:24:09.900 --> 00:24:12.450 exclude users from them and that it matters NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 91% (H?Y) 00:24:12.450 --> 00:24:20.200 How many people use them, the kind of property regimes that your resources are under and the more 00:24:20.200 --> 00:24:29.650 general socio-economic characteristics of sustainability so this is a very 00:24:29.650 --> 00:24:36.400 anthropological argument in the sense that it adds empirical complexity to what seems like a very 00:24:36.400 --> 00:24:42.699 straightforward clear intellectual argument, when you look at Hardin NOTE Treffsikkerhet: 88% (H?Y) 00:24:42.699 --> 00:24:51.600 Takes his argument and actually applies his argument to real empirical realities you get a much more 00:24:51.600 --> 00:25:01.300 complex story and findings and this is what anthropologists are often really good at