PENSUM
Davidson:
Fra Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press (1980): "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963), "Mental Events" (1970), "The Material Mind" (1973), "Psychology as Philosophy" (1974), "Hempel on Explaining Action" (1976).
Fra Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press (1984): "Radical Interpretation" (1973), "Belief and the Basis of Meaning" (1974), "Thought and Talk" (1975)
Fra Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford University Press (2001): "Three Varieties of Knowledge" (1991), "Indeterminism and Antirealism" (1997)
I tillegg: Davidson, D. (1993). "Thinking Causes" in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.) Mental Causation, Oxford University Press, 1993
Dennett:
Fra The Intentional Stance, MIT Press (1987): "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works" (1981), "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology" (1981), "Making Sense of Ourselves" (1981), i tillegg til refleksjonene.
Quine:
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object, MIT Press – kapittel 2.
?vrige bokutdrag:
Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics, MIT Press – kapittel 3.
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World, MIT Press – kapittel 1 og 2.
?vrige artikler:
Child, W. (1993). "Anomalism, Uncodifiability, and Psychophysical Relations" The Philosophical Review 102 (2): 215-245.
Heal, J. (1997). "Radical Interpretation" in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Blackwell Publishing, 1997
Kim, J. (1985). "Psychophysical Laws" in Supervenience and Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1993; Originally published in E. Lepore and B. McLaughlin (eds.) Actions and Events, Basil Blackwell,1985
Kim, J. (1993). "Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strict Laws' Save Anomalous Monism?" in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.) Mental Causation, Oxford University Press, 1993
Ramberg, B. (2000). "Post-ontological Philosophy of Mind: Rorty versus Davidson" in R. Brandom (ed.) Rorty and His Critics, Blackwell, 2000
Rorty, R. (1999). "Davidson's Mental-Physical Distinction" in L. E. Hahn (ed.) The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Open Court, 1999
Stich, S. (1981). "Dennett on Intentional Systems" Philosophical Topics 12: 38-62.
Yalowitz, S. (2005). “Anomalous Monism” i Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online)
Artiklene vil etter behov bli gjort tilgjengelige som masterkopier, men det anbefales at studentene anskaffer Dennetts The Intentional Stance, og de tre f?rste av Davidsons artikkelsamlinger nevnt over (i hvert fall de to f?rste).
KURSORISK:
S?rlig Davidsons arbeid er vanskelig og man vil ha utbytte av ? lese det sammen med en helhetlig sekund?rfremstilling. Her er noen forslag:
- Evnine, S. (1991). Donald Davidson, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press
- Joseph, M. (2004). Donald Davidson, Acumen
Disse er muligens vanskelige ? oppdrive. Da kan f?lgende flerforfattede bok gj?re samme nytten:
- Ludwig, K., (ed.) (2003). Donald Davidson, Cambridge University Press.
Det mest grundige (men veldig dyre og lange) alternativet er:
- Lepore, E. and K. Ludwig (2005). Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language, and Reality, Oxford, Clarendon Press
og en lett tilgjengelig oversiktsartikkel er:
- Malpas, J. (2005). “Donald Davidson” i Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online)
Hvis man ?nsker en helhetsframstilling av Dennett er en mulighet:
- Elton, M. (2003). Daniel Dennett: Reconciling Science and Our Self-Conception, Polity Press
For v?rt kurs vil kapittel 1 til 4 v?re tilstrekkelig.